The Battle of Berlin commenced on the night of 18/19 November 1943. It was thought by Sir Arthur Harris, head of Bomber Command, to have got off to a promising start, but the appalling dangers of the flights, over strongly defended enemy territory and across seas patrolled by German fighters, combined with the perils of the winter weather to take an appalling toll of RAF aircrew. This article by Sean Feast gives an overview of the Battle.
Sir Arthur Harris had always wanted to attack Berlin and by the summer of 1943 had sufficient resources to mount a campaign which he genuinely believed could cost Germany the war. The objective as defined in an Air Ministry Directive was:
‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened’.
Berlin was mentioned by name as a desired target which should be attacked ‘when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavourable to the morale of the enemy or favourable to that of Russia’.
The Battle of Berlin comprised 35 major raids conducted between 18 November 1943 and 31 March 1944, of which 16 were to the capital. The rest were against other cities including Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Leipzig, and, most famously, Nuremburg.
Without doubt the most controversial aspect of the battle, and the principal reason why it is remembered, is the appallingly high casualty rate inflicted by the Germans on Bomber Command aircrew. Harris warned the Battle would cost the Allies (i.e Bomber Command and the USAAF) between 400 and 500 aircraft. He claims the Battle actually cost the RAF 300 aircraft, a loss rate of 6.4% ‘which could not be considered excessive’.
The real figure, however, when all attacks are considered, is more than double that. To put these figures into context, Bill Chorley in his RAF Bomber Command Losses estimates Bomber Command lost – at the lowest estimate – the equivalent of 24 Main Force squadrons during the course of the Battle. Making good these losses was a constant strain.
But it wasn’t just the number that was alarming, it was also the quality and seniority of aircrew who were posted missing. Main Force lost at least 48 officers of the rank of squadron leader or above, including the commanding officers of 50 Squadron (Wg Cdr Edward Pullen), 51 Squadron (Wg Cdr Christopher Wright), 166 Squadron (Wg Cdr Colin Scragg), 207 Squadron (Wg Cdr Vashon Wheeler), 408 Squadron (Wg Cdr Alexander Mair), 626 Squadron (Wg Cdr Quentin Ross), 630 Squadron (Wg Cdr John Rollinson), and two COs of 100 Squadron (Wg Cdrs David Holford and John Dilworth). These were men Harris could ill-afford to lose.
Horrifying losses suffered by Pathfinder squadrons
But if the losses in Main Force were alarming, the casualties suffered by Pathfinder Force, which was at the vanguard of every raid, were truly catastrophic. Their leader, Donald Bennett, described the Battle as ‘the bitterest part of the war’ and with good reason, for he lost a high proportion of very experienced crews.
In one horrifying six‑week period, 87 Pathfinder crews became casualties and PFF had to recruit and retrain to marking standards nearly 50 crews each month during the Battle. There was never a shortage of crews, but the average level of experience within those crews continued to fall. Indeed, this is the critical fact: as with Main Force, whereas the quantity of aircrew lost provides the shock factor, it was the quality of crews lost that was particularly devastating. The heavy bomber squadrons of PFF (i.e those equipped with four-engined aircraft as opposed to Mosquitoes) lost something in the order of 1,200 aircrew during the Battle, and more than a third of that number were lost in a single month. Among the missing were one group captain, eight wing commanders and more than 20 squadron leaders – the very backbone to which Bennett refers.
In a three-week period between the end of January and the middle of February, 7 Squadron at Oakington – one of the founding squadrons of PFF – lost Ralph Young and James Tatnall, both wing commanders, and Richard Campling and John Hegman, both squadron leaders. At 40, Hegman need not have been flying at all; Tatnall – who was also pushing 40 – was being groomed as a future CO. The group captain killed in action was also from 7 Squadron, Kenneth Rampling, whose aircraft failed to return on the night of 22/23 March.
Wg Cdr Ray Hilton was only a few days into his command of 83 Squadron before he was shot down and killed at the start of the Battle. His successor, Wg Cdr Jack Abercromby, was also killed shortly after. One of the biggest losses occurred early on with the death of John White, a wing commander with 156 Squadron. He had previously played a crucial role in the attack on the rocket research establishment at Peenemunde. Every member of his crew had been decorated for gallantry and had close to 300 operations between them. This was the sort of calibre of crew that the Battle claimed.
Assessment
It is surprising, given the losses, that morale in Bomber Command remained as high as it did. But it was a close-run thing. As Harold Trilsbach, a squadron leader with 405 Squadron said in Pathfinders – The Definitive History:
‘The Battle of Berlin was the worst part of my operational flying. The worst weather, the most flak, most searchlights, and by far the greatest fighter opposition.’
Some crews undoubtedly lost heart, evidenced by the number of early returns or bombers seen to jettison their loads over water before crossing the enemy coast.
The Official History and post‑war historians have tended to characterise the Battle of Berlin as an abject failure. Donald Bennett was perhaps the harshest critic. He had been concerned from the outset that his crews were being asked to do a difficult job when experience was in short supply. He dared suggest the reason for the ‘failure’ of the Battle was that Main Force crews had ‘baulked at the jump’ and that fierce opposition, a high casualty rate and difficulties over hitting the target had led to ‘a state of mind amongst crews which automatically reduced the chances of success to negligible proportions’.
There was no doubt in Bennett’s mind that a very large number of crews ‘failed to carry out their attacks during the Battle of Berlin in their customary determined manner’, and while great damage had undoubtedly been done in Berlin, ‘the effect of each individual raid decreased as time went on’.
Bennett’s somewhat brutal analysis was in no doubt voiced in part to protect the reputation of his Pathfinders. The late author and historian Martin Middlebrook argues that the Battle must of course have contributed to the ultimate victory, but that while every pane of glass broken was a tiny drain on the German economy, the extent of the achievements was not sufficient either to satisfy the aims of the Battle or to justify the casualties.
Bomber crews would have been killed throughout the winter of 1943/1944 even had the Battle not taken place. The question that lies hanging is whether the casualties would have been lower and could more have been achieved had Harris directed his efforts elsewhere, and especially the industrial heartland of the Ruhr where Germany’s true industrial might was to be found.
Henry Probert, a biographer of Harris, offers a balanced view. While he admits that Bomber Command had clearly come off ‘second best’ in the battles over Germany, that did not mean that their sacrifices were in vain, nor that the campaign was futile. True they had not knocked Germany out of the war, but Germany had been obliged to devote huge resources to its air defence to such an extent that ‘it would ensure the success of the Normandy invasion and of other campaigns in the later stage of the war’.
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